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Introduction
The HIV/AIDS epidemic is a rapidly unfolding human development tragedy that
demands an urgent, scaled-up global response. Yet ill-founded qualms about
upsetting macroeconomic stability stand in the way of dramatically increasing
Official Development Assistance (ODA) to tackle the epidemic.
Even the debate about a possible trade-off between halting HIV/AIDS
and endangering macroeconomic stability is focused on the wrong
target—namely, safeguarding economic growth (see IMF 2005 and
Chowdhury and McKinley 2006). The overriding objective should
be to swiftly reduce human misery. Debating the prospects for
growth is of secondary importance.
A recent IMF publication (Gupta et al. 2006, p. 24)
notes, helpfully, that not all aid is geared to promoting
economic growth. Some forms of aid, such as for roads
and electricity, have obvious direct links to growth.
Other forms of aid, such as for education or health,
might affect growth less directly and more over the
long term. But a third form of aid, such as for humanitarian relief, might have little connection to growth. This latter case applies
to HIV/AIDS: combating it is justified primarily on the basis of arresting a human development crisis.
An earlier publication of the International Poverty Centre (McKinley 2005) dealt with the debate about the effect of scaling up ODA on
growth. However, this policy research brief has a fundamentally different starting point. Its governing assumptions are that 1) economic
growth is no more than a means to human development while 2) HIV/AIDS is a direct and disastrous assault on human development.
Hence, it concludes that direct, human-development centred methods to confront the epidemic are urgently needed.
The relevant way to frame the debate on HIV/AIDS is to first ask whether such direct methods can successfully combat the
epidemic. Then ask whether such methods are likely to exacerbate macroeconomic instability. If so, the next question is whether
the macroeconomic price of success against the epidemic is too high. This policy research brief maintains that such a price is
usually not high and where it threatens to be, coordination of economic policies could mitigate the danger. These policy lessons
are the core concerns of this research brief.
The Context for the Debate
During the last 25 years, close to 25 million people have died from HIV/AIDS and over 40 million people are now HIV-positive. Since 1.5
million people a year currently contract the virus, the number of people who are HIV-positive is projected to rise to 60 million by the
MDG target year of 2015. Thus, the epidemic is a huge threat to human well-being. It is also closely interwoven with
underdevelopment: 95 per cent of all people who are HIV-positive live in developing countries.
MDG #6 calls for halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS by 2015. But a dramatic mobilization of resources would be needed
to meet this goal. Between 1996 and 2005, spending on AIDS in developing countries did, indeed, increase—namely, 15-fold to
US$5 billion. But this still fell well short of the US$ 12 billion needed at that time. By 2007, the amount needed to halt the epidemic
will rise to US$ 20 billion.
In some countries in sub-Saharan Africa, there has already been a dramatic increase in external financing of HIV/AIDS programmes.
Table 1 shows the percentage increase in such financing for the period 2002-2004 for selected countries. For Tanzania the percentage
increase was almost 400 per cent while for Zambia it was almost 700 per cent. For countries such as Ethiopia, Uganda and Zambia, the
scale of HIV/AIDS financing approximated or exceeded that for the whole health sector.
By Terry McKinley and Degol Hailu
The Macroeconomic Debate
On Scaling up HIV/AIDS Financing
Internatinal Poverty Centre2
Does ODA Precipitate Macroeconomic Instability?
Such a rapid and sizeable scaling up of ODA for HIV/AIDS has
sounded alarm bells, however, among policy circles fixated on
macroeconomic stability as the centrepiece of growth and
development. In the countries cited in Table 1, external funding
for HIV/AIDS ranged between five and 35 per cent of total ODA
(Lewis 2005, p. 8). And much of the funding allocated each year
does not get disbursed. So, funding for HIV/AIDS alone is
unlikely, in most cases, to be a major cause of economy-wide
instability. Nonetheless, where such funding is significant,
national policymakers should carefully manage its
macroeconomic impact.
A substantial ramping up of ODA should finance additional
government spending on domestic goods and services for
HIV/AIDS programmes. This will be made possible by
converting the foreign exchange provided by ODA into
domestic currency for government purchases. Supposedly,
increased government purchases of domestic goods and
services would invariably drive up their prices, causing a
higher rate of inflation. This is supposed to apply, in
particular, to ‘non-tradable’ goods and services, whose prices
are not determined by international forces.
What will happen to the foreign currency (say U.S. dollars)
originally provided by ODA, which are now held as net foreign
assets by the Central Bank? The reserves could be sold
domestically to the private sector for financing of imports. When
dollars are exchanged for domestic currency, the latter is taken
back out of the economy. If the stock of dollars is sold completely,
the original injection of domestic currency would be fully
offset. If inflation had increased when the government spent
the domestic currency, it should subside when the domestic
currency is extracted from domestic circulation. Moreover, the
country should be able to use the ODA to deal better with a
rise in inflation caused by more costly imports (such as oil).
The standard argument is that the increased demand for
domestic currency (corresponding to the selling of U.S. dollars)
should immediately increase the nominal exchange rate
(i.e., the value of the domestic currency vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar).
This effect will happen automatically if the exchange rate
regime is fully flexible. If the exchange rate is fixed, it will
happen by raising the domestic price index vis-à-vis the U.S.
price index, i.e., raising the real exchange rate. This predicted
appreciation of the exchange rate is usually labeled as a ‘Dutch
Disease’ (because the discovery of natural gas in the Netherlands
was an early example of how a large inflow of foreign exchange
supposedly appreciated the exchange rate).
But what is the evidence for such an adverse impact of ODA on
the exchange rate? Recent assessments find, in fact, that an
upsurge in ODA has been associated with depreciation of the
exchange rate. Gupta et al. (2006) and Foster and Killick (2006),
taken together, studied the macroeconomic impact of scaling
up ODA in seven African countries. In six of the seven, domestic
inflation declined after such a scaling up. In four of the seven,
the real exchange rate depreciated and in two others it
changed little. So, there was very weak, if not contradictory,
evidence of ‘Dutch Disease’ effects.
So far, there has been no adequate explanation for the
depreciation of the exchange rate in these circumstances (see
IMF 2005 and Gupta et al. 2006). One implicit explanation is that
while the governments spent most of the domestic-currency
equivalent of the ODA, the central bank did not sell the
corresponding foreign-exchange reserves (in some cases
because of IMF-mandated targets on reserves). Thus, there was
limited upward pressure on the nominal exchange rate. A fuller
explanation would involve, however, an examination of changes
in the non-aid current account and the non-aid capital account.
A well-known IMF study, Prati et al. (2003), used a sophisticated
regression model to test for the effect of ODA on the real
exchange rate. Its main result was that a projected doubling of
ODA would cause the real exchange rate to appreciate by only
four per cent in the short run. Although statistically significant,
this is a marginal effect. A general conclusion from the limited
number of studies that have directly tested this relationship is
that the evidence is inconclusive, at best.
Are HIV/AIDS Expenditures Destabilizing?
ODA financing of HIV/AIDS expenditures is not likely, by itself,
to be destabilizing. In general, its effect will depend on both
the composition and the size of expenditures. If aid for HIV/
AIDS is in-kind (such as medicines), this will, by definition, have
no monetary impact. If the government uses foreign currency
to purchase imports (instead of converting it into domestic
currency), there will also be no effect.
If ODA-financed expenditures are focused on domestic ‘non-
tradables’, instead of exportables or importables, the monetary
impact could, by contrast, be significant—in theory. However,
in relatively small economies increasingly open to global trade
Table 1
The Scaling up of External Financing for HIV/AIDS
in Selected African Countries, 2002-2004
Source: Lewis 2005.
Country Percentage Change in Financing 
Ethiopia 115 
Kenya 82 
Malawi 283 
Mozambique 321 
Tanzania 394 
Uganda 221 
Zambia 698 
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and finance, the distinction between ‘nontradables’ and ‘tradables’
might not be easy to identify. Global forces have a much larger
and broader impact on domestic inflation than ever before.
In order to understand the potential impact of ODA, we need
to know what it will finance. UNAIDS estimates that for sub-
Saharan Africa, 38 per cent of all expenditures will be for care
and treatment, 35 per cent for prevention and 22 per cent for
orphan support. Treatment involves substantial importing of
antiretroviral medicines, which will have little monetary
impact. Imports of related medical supplies and equipment
(also ‘tradables’) should have similar negligible impacts.
What then could be the source of inflationary pressures? In
low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as
elsewhere, wages and salaries are a large proportion of total
healthcare costs. Health workers will be needed to dispense
the medicines or run the medical equipment. In this case,
would the increased demand for health personnel, especially
skilled physicians and nurses, cause problems? On the whole,
workers in such social sectors as healthcare are low-paid,
especially after structural-adjustment budget cuts. A more
likely problem is the shortage of doctors and nurses—precisely
because their skills are ‘tradable’ globally. Many have left for
higher salaries in more developed countries.
There are various ways to address these potential problems.
One is to develop forms of treatment that are less reliant on
highly trained personnel. For example, the model in Haiti has
stressed the use of minimally trained outreach workers for low-
income communities. Another option is to devote more
resources to upgrading the skills of health personnel.
Concentrating investments on such capacity development
should be a priority of any HIV/AIDS strategy. Also critical are
investments in healthcare infrastructure and institutional
capacity—especially important for the sustained treatment
necessary for HIV/AIDS. Moreover, over the longer term, such
investments will help mitigate any adverse monetary impacts
of external financing of HIV/AIDS.
In sum, any adverse macroeconomic effects of spending on
HIV/AIDS should not be significant enough to warrant major
changes in the size of expenditures, or even in their
composition—certainly not between broad priorities such as
prevention or treatment.
Managing Macroeconomic Policies
Let us assume, contrary to recent evidence, that a substantial
ODA- financed scaling up of expenditures on HIV/AIDS does,
indeed, cause macroeconomic problems. How should
macroeconomic policies be adjusted to address such a
possibility? There should be little question that fiscal policies
have to be expansionary. Because HIV/AIDS is a dire threat to
human development, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, there is
an urgent need for large-scale, broadly-targeted government
programmes. ODA financing of larger government deficits is
designed, in fact, precisely in order to dramatically expand
domestic expenditures.
The composition of expenditures, such as on prevention or
treatment, will depend, in part, on the HIV/AIDS prevalence
rate in a country. Nevertheless, a significant proportion of
financing should go to public investment that can expand the
capacity of the health system. Otherwise, large quantities of
imported medicines, such as antiretrovirals, cannot be
delivered to the people who need them.
What often troubles many central bankers about expansionary
fiscal policies is the spectre of accelerating inflation. But monetary
policies should accommodate an expansion of government
expenditures, not undermine it. This would entail abandoning
the inordinate fear of inflation that induces central banks to set
excessively low targets (e.g., 3-5 per cent per year) (see McKinley
2005). Fortunately, some IMF researchers have already concluded
that inflation rates of 5-10 per cent are not likely to harm growth,
at least in sub-Saharan Africa (Gupta et al. 2006, p. 18).
In many cases, moderate inflation should not deter
policymakers from aggressively expanding expenditures in
order to confront the HIV/AIDS threat. Halting the epidemic is a
moral imperative. But it is also an economic priority since it will
preserve higher productivity of the labour force—and will thus,
conceivably, lower future inflation.
A major roadblock to implementing expansionary fiscal
policies and accommodating monetary policies is the
current penchant of central banks to use ODA to build up
large stockpiles of foreign-exchange reserves. Table 2 shows,
for example, that in Ethiopia, 71 per cent of net aid inflows
went, in effect, into an increase in reserves, and in Tanzania,
100 per cent.
Table 2
The Impact of Aid (% of GDP)
The difference in percentage before and during an aid surge
Note 1: Contrary to convention, a positive change in reserves is expressed as a positive percentage.
Source: Foster and Killick 2006, p. 14.
Country Net Aid Inflows 
Non-aid Current 
Account 
Non-aid Capital 
Account 
Change in 
Reserves1 
Ethiopia 8.0 -1.6 -0.7 5.7 
Ghana 5.5 10.0 -7.8 7.6 
Mauritania 4.8 -5.3 3.2 5.0 
Mozambique 5.9 -3.9 -0.4 1.7 
Tanzania 2.2 2.3 -2.4 2.2 
Uganda 4.7 -1.3 -2.8 0.7 
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To a certain degree, building up reserves is well advised. It will
help central banks manage the exchange rate. This is important
if aid-financed scaling up of government expenditures does,
indeed, lead to higher inflation and appreciation of the exchange
rate. With sufficient reserves, central banks could time their sale,
i.e., their exchange for domestic currency, in order to moderate
any pressures for appreciation.
This point highlights the need for coordinating monetary and
exchange rate policies with fiscal policies (see Chowdhury and
McKinley 2006). If the exchange rate were fully determined by
market forces, it could fluctuate wildly, prompting the
acceleration— if not the overshooting—of appreciation as a
result of a large upsurge in ODA.
Table 2 also provides clues about why many of the countries
studied by both the IMF and ODI  did not experience
appreciation of their exchange rate when net aid inflows surged.
In five of the six countries listed, capital flowed out of the
country in conjunction with an ODA inflow. In Tanzania, for
instance, the non-aid capital that flowed out of the country
(2.4 per cent of GDP) exceeded the net aid inflow (2.2 per cent).
A similar negative correlation is evident in other countries such
as Botswana, Kenya, Namibia and Senegal.
This suggests the need to manage the capital account. In most
low-income countries, disincentives should be instituted against
spiriting capital out of the country. One useful precaution would
be to refrain from depositing foreign exchange in commercial
banks, where it can be used easily to buy foreign assets. Without
some regulation of capital outflows, national policymakers will
have difficulty in implementing the fiscal and monetary policies
needed to combat HIV/AIDS.
Conclusion
The current scale and composition of external financing for HIV/AIDS
should not threaten macroeconomic stability. Even where
instability might be exacerbated, carefully managed macroeconomic
policies could abate any adverse consequences. However, such
policies should not justify holding back government expenditures on
HIV/AIDS programmes or dictate false trade-offs between various
forms of expenditures, such as between prevention and treatment
A full range of government expenditures should be urgently
rolled out in order to confront the crisis. One qualification is that
a significant share of ODA-financed expenditures should be
channeled into investment to build up the capacity of national
healthcare systems (viz., create more institutional capacity, more
trained personnel and more health infrastructure). This will, in
fact, help mitigate any ODA-induced inflationary pressures over
the longer term.
While fiscal policies should be expansionary, careful management
of macroeconomic policies would also generally imply that
1) monetary policies be moderately relaxed in order to
accommodate fiscal expansion, 2) exchange rate policies be
designed to manage market-induced volatility, particularly
from large capital inflows and 3) capital management techniques
be instituted, especially in order to regulate capital outflows that
can undermine the macroeconomic benefits of net aid inflows.
Although stated as general rules, these policies would have to be
adjusted, in fact, to the macroeconomic specifics of each country.
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